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ABSTRACT 
Although single-sex public schools in the United States were 
virtually nonexistent in the 1980s, the popularity of public single-sex 
elementary and secondary schools has increased dramatically in the 
past fifteen years. This increase occurred as a result of a variety of 
factors, including the deficiencies of coeducational school settings, 
increasing research showing the benefits of single-sex education, 
and support by federal law under the No Child Left Behind Act and 
Department of Education regulations. However, schools attempting 
to use the educational benefits of single-sex education to provide 
individualized instruction to their students continue to face the threat 
of litigation for their well-intentioned efforts. School districts fearing 
the risks of this litigation are thus pressured to discontinue 
experimentation with these programs despite the federal 
government’s encouragement of this experimentation. This result is 
undesirable in the current educational environment, where 
educational reform is of paramount importance, federal standards 
increasingly demand more of schools, and school accountability is 
the education mantra. 
The reason for this situation is simple―Supreme Court cases 
analyzing the constitutionality of sex-class isolations have applied 
conflicting standards of review. The Supreme Court’s application of 
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the intermediate scrutiny standard has ranged from applying a more 
demanding intermediate scrutiny standard in some cases to adopting 
a more relaxed intermediate scrutiny standard in others. Conversely, 
lower federal courts have increasingly accepted state-sponsored 
single-sex educational options that exhibit the requisite safeguards. 
Without a clear standard for analyzing sex-class isolations, the 
constitutionality of single-sex education will remain on insecure 
footing. Schools attempting to implement single-sex educational 
programs will continue to be faced with the threat of lawsuits, 
despite the fact that the trend of current research, public opinion, 
and federal law supports their position. 
In order to remedy this problem, the Supreme Court must 
reaffirm its commitment to the “traditional” intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review for analyzing single-sex educational programs. 
As such, in reviewing single-sex educational programs or schools, 
the Supreme Court should simply analyze (1) whether the state 
furthers an “important governmental objective” in establishing the 
school or program and (2) whether the state’s means are 
“substantially related to achievement” of this objective. In so doing, 
the Supreme Court would reconcile its conflicting standards of 
review with the increasing acceptance of single-sex education 
programs in popular opinion, federal law, and lower federal courts. 
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In 1991, the Detroit School Board addressed its “high 
unemployment rates, school dropout levels and homicide among 
urban males” by attempting to open all-male elementary and middle 
schools for African-American males.1 These schools focused on 
overcoming the educational hurdles that urban males faced by 
providing them with individualized counselors, mentors, and career 
advisors.2 Additionally, the schools adopted a specialized Afrocentric 
curriculum and extended weekday classes.3 Prior to establishing 
                                                     
 1.  Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id.  
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these schools, the Board reviewed experimental programs focused on 
the special needs of urban males and found these programs 
successful.4 In fact, the Board found that these schools were “critical 
. . . to keep[ing] urban males out of the City’s morgues and prisons.”5  
However, a suit brought in the Eastern District of Michigan 
ultimately frustrated the Board’s hopes to remedy the hurdles faced 
by urban males.6 After a female student sued the school board on 
equal protection grounds, the Eastern District of Michigan granted a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the Board from opening these 
schools.7 The court found that while the school’s purpose was 
“important,” and the status of urban males was “endangered,” this 
was insufficient to overcome the standard set by the Supreme Court 
in Mississippi University for Woman v. Hogan for analyzing state-
authorized sex-class isolations.8 
Garrett v. Board of Education of the School District of the City 
of Detroit is a classic example of how schools nationwide have 
attempted to use the educational benefits of single-sex education to 
provide individualized instruction to their students only to face the 
threat of litigation for the schools’ well-intentioned efforts.9 The 
reason for this situation is simple: Supreme Court cases analyzing 
sex-class isolations have applied conflicting standards of review.10 
Without a clear standard for analyzing sex-class isolations, the 
                                                     
 4. See id. at 1008 n.6. The assistant principal at one of the schools, over a 
period of three years, provided male students with a “voluntary extra-curricular 
mentorship program, ‘Man to Man.’” Id. This program achieved “some 
improvement in the academic status of male participants.” Id. 
 5. Id. at 1008. 
 6. Cf. id. at 1014.  
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. Ostensibly, the Garrett court required Detroit to show that its 
sex-based classification served an important government interest and that its means 
were “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 1006 
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). However, 
like the Supreme Court in Hogan, the Garrett court applied a rigorous scrutiny of 
the state’s alleged objectives and required the school district to show that its single-
sex admissions program was necessary to achieve this objective in every instance—
that the exclusion of girls was necessary in every instance in order to improve 
minority boys’ academic achievement. See id. at 1007-08. Therefore, like Hogan, 
Garrett represents a federal court’s application of a heightened form of intermediate 
scrutiny. Cf. infra Section III.A. 
 9. See David S. Cohen & Nancy Levit, Still Unconstitutional: Our 
Nation’s Experiment with State-Sponsored Sex Segregation in Education, 44 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 339, 344-46 (2014) (describing litigation surrounding schools that 
have implemented single-sex education programs).  
 10. See infra Section I.D.  
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constitutionality of single-sex education will remain in limbo.11
Schools attempting to implement single-sex educational programs 
will continue to be faced with the threat of lawsuits, despite the fact 
that the trend of current research,12 public opinion,13 and federal law14
supports the schools’ position. 
In order to remedy this problem, the Supreme Court must 
reaffirm its commitment to the “traditional” intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review for analyzing single-sex educational programs.15
As such, in reviewing single-sex educational programs or schools, 
the Supreme Court should simply analyze (1) whether the state 
furthers an “important governmental objective[]” in establishing the 
school or program; and (2) whether the state’s means are 
“substantially related to achievement” of this objective.16
Part I of this Note discusses the background and development 
of single-sex education, federal law regulating single-sex education, 
and lower federal courts’ jurisprudence in the broader context of sex-
class isolations.17 Part II examines the constitutional theories 
undergirding the Supreme Court’s “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” standard of review18 that it adopted in two recent 
                                                     
11. See Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next 
Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1953, 1998-2000 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s differing 
interpretations of the standard of review applicable to single-sex education could 
lead to either a too strict or too permissive scrutiny of state-sponsored single-sex 
education programs and schools). 
12. See infra Section I.B. 
13. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Section I.C. 
15. Throughout this Note, the “traditional” intermediate scrutiny standard 
refers to the standard that the Court applied to sex classifications prior to its 
introduction of the confusing “extremely persuasive justification” language in 
analyzing sex classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Under 
the traditional intermediate scrutiny test, the Court analyzes whether the state 
furthers an important government objective using means substantially related to 
achieving that objective. See id.  
16. See id.  
17. See infra Part I. 
18. Throughout this Note, the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
standard of review will be referred to as the “Virginia standard of review.” This 
standard of review refers to the standard that the Supreme Court explicitly adopted 
in analyzing the constitutionality of the sex classifications in United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996). Under the Virginia standard of review, the 
Court requires a state to provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its 
sex-class isolation. See id.
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cases.19 Finally, Part III proposes that the Supreme Court follow the 
trend of public opinion, federal law, and lower federal courts’ 
jurisprudence by reaffirming its commitment to the traditional 
intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing the constitutionality of 
single-sex educational options.20   
I. THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF SINGLE-SEX 
EDUCATION LAW 
Although single-sex public schools in the United States were 
virtually nonexistent in the 1980s,21 the popularity of public single-
sex elementary and secondary schools has increased dramatically in 
the past fifteen years.22 In 2002, about fifteen public schools in the 
United States offered single-sex classroom options.23 By 2012, the 
number of public schools that offered single-sex classroom options 
increased to over 506 nationwide.24 This increase occurred as a result 
of a variety of factors, including the deficiencies of coeducational 
school settings, increasing research showing the benefits of single-
sex education, and support by federal law.25 
                                                     
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See Single-Sex Public Schools in the United States, NAT’L ASS’N FOR 
SINGLE-SEX PUB. EDUC., http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20050404003134/http:/www.singlesexschools.org/scho
ols-schools.htm] (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (listing only two single-sex public 
schools in existence in the United States during the late 1980s). 
 22. See id.; Motoko Rich, Old Tactic Gets New Use: Public Schools 
Separate Girls and Boys, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/01/education/single-sex-education-public-schools-separate-boys-and-
girls.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad&_r=2. 
 23. See Single-Sex Public Schools in the United States, supra note 21. 
 24. See Single-Sex Schools / Schools with Single-Sex Classrooms / What’s 
the Difference?, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SINGLE-SEX PUB. EDUC., 
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). Other 
organizations’ data provide even higher numbers; according to the Feminist 
Majority Foundation, over 1,000 public schools offered single-sex classes between 
2007 and 2010. See SUE KLEIN, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., STATE OF PUBLIC 
SCHOOL SEX SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2007-2010: PART I: PATTERNS OF 
K-12 SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE U.S. 14 (2012), 
http://www.feminist.org/education/pdfs/sex_segregation_study_part1.pdf. 
 25. See infra Sections I.A-C. 
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A. The Deficiencies of Coeducational Settings 
In the 1970s, researchers began discovering extensive patterns 
of gender bias within coeducational school settings.26 This gender 
bias included teachers associating certain academic subjects with a 
particular gender27 and girls being “less comfortable speaking out in 
class” and “receiv[ing] less teacher attention” and feedback from 
teachers than boys.28 By the 1990s, studies revealed that girls in 
coeducational settings “often [were] not expected or encouraged to 
pursue higher-level mathematics and science courses.”29 Researchers 
showed that this lack of equitable treatment resulted in lower self-
esteem, achievement, and career opportunities for girls.30 Other 
research focused on the disproportionate amount of harassment that 
girls suffered in coeducational settings, including sexual 
harassment.31 As a result, both researchers and educators concluded 
that various factors inherent in coeducational settings have a negative 
influence on the educational attainment and career opportunities of 
many girls in coeducational settings.32 
                                                     
 26. See Amanda Datnow & Lea Hubbard, Introduction to GENDER IN 
POLICY AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL 
SCHOOLING 2-3 (Amanda Datnow & Lea Hubbard eds., 2002) (“[M]any studies over 
the past twenty-five years have documented gender bias against females in 
coeducational classrooms both at the K-12 and higher education levels.”); 
ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX 
SCHOOLING 70-71 (2003) (discussing studies revealing gender bias in coeducational 
settings during the late 1970s and 1980s). 
 27. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 71. 
 28. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 3 (“Females have historically 
received less teacher attention than boys [and] feel less comfortable speaking out in 
class . . . .”). 
 29. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, HOW SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE 
GIRLS—THE AAUW REPORT 147 (1992); see also John Borkowski, Single Gender 
Education and the Constitution, Speech at ABA Convention (Aug. 6, 1994), in 40 
LOY. L. REV. 253, 275 (1994) (noting the research indicating the gender equity 
concerns in the teaching of math and science classes); cf. Steven J. Spencer, Claude 
M. Steele & Diane M. Quinn, Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math Performance, 
35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 7, 21-22 (1999) (arguing that differences in 
math ability between boys and girls result from “stereotype threat[s]” often caused 
by “[s]imply being in a situation where one can confirm a negative stereotype about 
one’s group”). 
 30. See MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: HOW 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 1 (1994). 
 31. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GENDER GAPS: WHERE SCHOOLS 
STILL FAIL OUR CHILDREN 85 (1999) (finding that the rates of sexual harassment 
were 85% for girls and 76% for boys). 
 32. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 71. 
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Conversely, other researchers have argued that coeducational 
settings disadvantage boys in various ways.33 Studies support this 
proposition, with boys lagging behind girls in educational 
aspirations, grades, and enrollment in rigorous academic programs.34 
Additionally, boys are more often referred to special-education 
programs and are more likely to be involved in violence, drugs, and 
alcohol while in school.35 In fact, some researchers have concluded 
that greater gender bias exists against boys than against girls in 
coeducational settings.36  
Coeducational settings have been shown to be even more 
disadvantageous to urban minority males.37 For example, the drop-
out rate of African-American males in coeducational settings is often 
two to three times higher than the rate of other racial groups.38 
Further, the academic performance of African-American, urban 
males is lower than that of other racial groups.39  
With research showing that coeducational settings disadvantage 
both sexes, educators, researchers, and other policy-making entities 
focused on finding educational alternatives to remedy the gender 
equity problems occurring in coeducational settings.40 Single-sex 
education emerged as one of the possible alternatives to address the 
disparate outcomes and problems faced by boys and girls in 
                                                     
 33. See MICHAEL GURIAN, PATRICIA HENLEY & TERRY TRUEMAN, BOYS 
AND GIRLS LEARN DIFFERENTLY! 63-66 (2001); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, 
at 3; SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 235; Ann Hulbert, Boy Problems: The Real 
Gender Crisis in Education Starts with the Y Chromosome, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2005 (Magazine), at 13, 13-14 (showing that boys lag behind girls in college 
enrollment, the number of college degrees earned, and test scores). 
 34. See CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST BOYS: HOW 
MISGUIDED FEMINISM IS HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN 14, 24 (2000). 
 35. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 3; Hulbert, supra note 33, at 
13-14 (discussing the educational problems disadvantaging boys). 
 36. GURIAN, HENLEY & TRUEMAN, supra note 33, at 54. 
 37. See Antoine M. Garibaldi, The Educational Status of African American 
Males in the 21st Century, 76 J. NEGRO EDUC. 324, 324 (2007). 
 38. See Audrey T. McCluskey, The Historical Context of the Single-Sex 
Schooling Debate Among African Americans, 17 W.J. BLACK STUD. 193, 195 
(1993). 
 39. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & MEREDITH PHILLIPS, THE BLACK-WHITE 
TEST SCORE GAP 45-62 (1998). 
 40. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 3 (“Gender bias is now seen 
as affecting both girls and boys, because neither group is immune to societal 
pressures and expectations.”). 
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coeducational settings.41 After closer examination, the benefits of 
single-sex education became apparent.42 
B. The Benefits of Single-Sex Education 
The benefits of single-sex education proved to be numerous.43 
For instance, studies have shown that single-sex education decreases 
the chances that boys and girls will categorize subjects as being 
either masculine or feminine.44 Single-sex education has also been 
shown to provide students with a more organized, controlled, and 
ordered educational environment.45 Additionally, research shows that 
single-sex education tends to motivate students to be more 
academically minded, with boys focusing less on “athletic ability” 
and girls focusing less on “physical attractiveness.”46  
Single-sex environments have been shown to be particularly 
beneficial to girls.47 In contrast to their counterparts in coeducational 
schools, girls in single-sex schools are more likely to prefer and 
excel in science, technology, and math courses.48 Further, research 
supports the fact that the benefits of single-sex schooling for girls 
                                                     
 41. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 29, at 3-5; Datnow & 
Hubbard, supra note 26, at 2-3; SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 4-5; Denise C. 
Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the 
Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 
389-90. 
 42. See infra Section I.B. 
 43. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. 
 44. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 235; Pamela Haag, Single-Sex 
Education in Grades K-12: What Does the Research Tell Us?, in THE JOSSEY-BASS 
READER ON GENDER IN EDUCATION 647, 653-54 (Elisa Rassen et al. eds., 2002); 
Fred A. Mael, Single-Sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to 
Socioemotional and Academic Development, 68 REV. EDUC. RES. 101, 111 (1998). 
 45. See Haag, supra note 44, at 655. 
 46. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 198-200. Salomone notes that 
students in single-sex schools spent more time on homework and had a higher focus 
on academic and educational achievements. See id. at 199.  
 47. See id. at 207-08. One of the several examples of single-sex schools that 
achieved prominent success in improving educational outcomes for girls was the 
Thurgood Marshall Elementary School in Seattle, Washington. See Leonard Sax, 
The Promise and Peril of Single-Sex Public Education, EDUC. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), 
Mar. 2, 2005, at 48. As a coeducational institution, none of the girls enrolled in the 
school passed the state math exam the year before the school became single-sex. Id. 
The year after the change, 53% of the girls passed the state math exam. Id. 
 48. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 207-08; Haag, supra note 44, at 653; 
Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term 
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 471 (1999); Mael, 
supra note 44, at 108-09, 111. 
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extend beyond education into the career field.49 Women graduates 
from single-sex schools are twice as likely to have doctorates as 
those graduating from coeducational schools and are more likely to 
have a successful career.50 
Additionally, single-sex schooling has been shown to be 
particularly helpful in improving educational outcomes for minority 
and disadvantaged students.51 Studies have shown that African-
American and Hispanic students enrolled in single-sex schools 
perform better academically than their counterparts who attend 
coeducational schools.52 In fact, single-sex education programs may 
be one of the very few school reforms that have proven successful in 
urban school districts.53 However, despite the research showing the 
benefits of single-sex education, federal courts and federal law 
provided no support for experimentation in single-sex education, but 
rather discouraged such experimentation until 2001.54  
C. Single-Sex Education and Federal Law 
Beginning in the twenty-first century, single-sex public 
education received valuable support from the federal government in 
the No Child Left Behind Act and new Department of Education 
regulations.55 The No Child Left Behind Act,56 enacted in 2001, 
                                                     
 49. See Laura Clark, More Career Women Come from Single-Sex Schools, 
DAILY MAIL (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
406374/More-career-women-come-single-sex-schools.html. The study discussed in 
this article showed that single-sex schooling provided women with more confidence 
in negotiating salaries and helped women break into traditionally male-dominated 
career fields such as math and physics. Id.; see also M. Elizabeth Tidball, Women’s 
Colleges and Women Achievers Revisited, 5 J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 504, 
509, 515 (1980) (discussing studies showing females enrolled in single-sex schools 
are more likely to have successful careers).  
 50. See Tidball, supra note 49, at 509, 515. 
 51. See Cornelius Riordan, What Do We Know About the Effects of Single-
Sex Schools in the Private Sector?: Implications for Public Schools, in GENDER IN 
POLICY AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL 
SCHOOLING, supra note 26, at 10, 14, 28; see also McCluskey, supra note 38, at 195. 
 52. See CORNELIUS RIORDAN, GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL: TOGETHER OR 
SEPARATE? 112-13 (1990). 
 53. Cf. Riordan, supra note 51, at 14. Riordan argues that single-sex 
education benefits students because it “provide[s] an avenue for students to make a 
proacademic choice, thereby affirming their intrinsic agreement to work in the kind 
of environment we identify as effective and equitable.” Id. at 28. 
 54. See infra note 61 and accompanying text; see also infra Section I.D. 
 55. See infra notes 56, 60 and accompanying text. 
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provided a limited amount of federal funding for local educational 
agencies to experiment with single-sex education.57 The Act further 
required the Secretary of Education to promulgate regulations to 
implement this provision.58 
The Department of Education followed this requirement by 
adopting a similar position in 2006 with the release of new 
regulations that increased the flexibility of the Title IX Education 
Amendments of 197259 with regard to public single-sex education 
options.60 Prior to 2006, Title IX allowed single-sex education 
programs in only a very limited context.61 However, the new 
regulations were more flexible, permitting schools to implement 
single-sex programs if the school demonstrated an “important 
objective” for doing so.62 Two objectives qualified in this regard: (1) 
improving educational outcomes by providing for “diverse 
                                                                                                                
 56. Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1112(c)(1)(G), 115 Stat. 1425, 1465 (codified at 
20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(G) (2012)). This Act’s purpose was “[t]o close the 
achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left 
behind.” Id. 
 57. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23) (2012). (providing that innovative program 
funds may be used for “[p]rograms to provide same-gender schools and classrooms 
(consistent with applicable law)”). 
 58. Id. § 7215(c). 
 59. Title IX Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination based 
on sex in educational programs and activities that receive financial assistance from 
the federal government. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_ 
dis.html (last modified Apr. 29, 2015). 
 60. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i) (2008). 
 61. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2005). Title IX regulations precluded a federal 
funding recipient from “provid[ing] any course or otherwise carry[ing] out any of its 
education program[s] or activit[ies] separately on the basis of sex, or requir[ing] or 
refus[ing] participation therein by any of its students on such basis.” Id. However, 
private elementary, secondary, and undergraduate admissions policies were 
exempted from these regulations. Id. § 106.15(d).   
 62. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i) (2008); see also Rebecca A. 
Kiselewich, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public 
Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 227-28 (2008). The 
new regulations allowed school districts to set up single-sex schools as long as 
“substantially equal” single-sex schools existed for both sexes or a coeducational 
option was available. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(iv). Conversely, the previous 
regulations only allowed single-sex schools to exist if “substantially equal” single-
sex schools existed for both sexes. 34 C.F.R. § 106.35 (2005). Additionally, the new 
regulations allowed elementary and secondary coeducational schools to provide a 
variety of single-sex classes and extracurricular activities. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.34(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (2008). 
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educational opportunities” or (2) providing individualized instruction 
to meet the specific needs of individual students.63 
The new regulations safeguarded against sex discrimination as 
well.64 The Department required that single-sex programs adopted by 
schools be voluntary and implemented evenhandedly.65 Further, 
schools experimenting with single-sex educational options were 
required to provide a “substantially equal coeducational class . . . in 
the same subject.”66  
In response to increasing inquiries about the legality of single-
sex education, the Obama Administration released new guidelines 
for school districts in December 2014.67 These guidelines essentially 
mirrored the regulations implemented by the Department of 
Education under the Bush Administration.68 As such, federal law and 
regulations eventually caught up with popular opinion and research 
related to single-sex education.69 However, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence developed in the opposite direction.70 
D. Single-Sex Education and Federal Courts 
State and federal statutory classifications on the basis of sex 
have customarily been reviewed by federal courts under the Equal 
Protection Clause.71 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has applied an 
intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing sex-class isolations, such 
                                                     
 63. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B). 
 64. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
 65. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii)-(iii). 
 66. Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(iv). Factors to be considered in determining whether 
classes are “substantially equal”; include the “quality, range, and content of 
curriculum”; “the quality and availability of books, instructional materials, and 
technology”; “the qualifications of faculty and staff”; and “the quality, accessibility, 
and availability of facilities and resources provided to the class.” Id. § 106.34(b)(3). 
“Intangible features” can also be considered. Id. 
 67. Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., Education Department Clarifies 
Requirements for Offering Single-Sex Classes (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/ 
news/press-releases/education-department-clarifies-requirements-offering-single-
sex-classes. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See supra notes 56, 60 and accompanying text (discussing the increased 
flexibility of federal law and regulations with regard to experimentation with single-
sex education programs in public schools). 
 70. See infra Section I.D. 
 71. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (holding that statutory 
classifications on the basis of sex are “subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause”). 
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as those involved in single-sex education.72 Intermediate scrutiny lies 
in the middle of the Court’s other two levels of scrutiny: strict 
scrutiny and rational-basis scrutiny.73 Rational-basis review only 
requires the law at issue to be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest.74 Conversely, strict scrutiny requires the law 
at issue to be “narrowly tailored” to “further compelling 
governmental interests.”75 Intermediate scrutiny review requires laws 
to bear a “substantial relationship to important governmental 
objectives.”76 
The Supreme Court has ruled on various facets of single-sex 
education on three different occasions,77 most recently in 1996 in 
United States v. Virginia.78 In two of the most recent cases evaluating 
the constitutionality of the sex classifications involved in single-sex 
                                                     
 72. See infra Subsection I.D.1 (providing examples of Supreme Court cases 
analyzing the constitutionality of sex-class isolations under the intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review). 
 73. See David K. Bowsher, Cracking the Code of United States v. Virginia, 
48 DUKE L.J. 305, 306 (1998). 
 74. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas 
of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along 
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule [in equal protection 
cases] is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (“In these cases, involving 
distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there 
is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of 
the state legislatures.”). 
 75. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 76. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). 
 77. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 430 U.S. 703 (1977). In Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held single-sex public schools for each gender were 
constitutional because they were “similar and of equal quality.” 532 F.2d 880, 882, 
888 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d mem., 430 U.S. 703 (1977). The Third Circuit based its 
decision on the fact that “there are differences between the sexes which may, in 
limited circumstances, justify disparity in the law.” Id. at 886. In so doing, the Third 
Circuit found single-sex education to be a “respected educational methodology.” Id. 
at 888. An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s holding 
without issuing a formal opinion. Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703. Because the 
Vorchheimer Court did not issue an opinion or apply a specific standard of review, 
this case does not carry particular weight in this Note’s discussion. See Subsections 
I.D.1-3. 
 78. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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education, the Court utilized a new analytical framework, requiring 
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the sex classification.79 
This analytical framework is contrasted by another line of cases in 
which the Court adhered to the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review in analyzing sex classifications.80 Conversely, 
lower federal courts post-Virginia have increasingly accepted the sex 
classifications involved in single-sex educational programs that 
exhibited the requisite safeguards.81 Thus, the constitutionality of 
single-sex education in public schools remains on insecure footing.82 
1. The Intermediate Scrutiny Standard of Review 
Beginning in 1976 with Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court 
applied an intermediate scrutiny test to sex-class isolations.83 Under 
this standard, the Court required sex-class isolations to further an 
important governmental interest and be substantially related to the 
achievement of that interest.84 Typically, this requires that states 
resort to sex-class isolations only when the state cannot achieve its 
interest through sex-neutral classifications.85 Thus, in Craig v. Boren, 
the Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that 
differentiated the cut-off age for buying alcohol based on sex.86 The 
Court’s reasoning centered on the fact that the sex classification was 
unnecessary for the state to address its safety concerns; setting an 
equal cut-off age for both sexes was just as effective in addressing 
those concerns.87  
                                                     
 79. See id. at 534; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731. 
 80. See infra Subsection I.D.3. 
 81. See infra Subsection I.D.4. 
 82. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Comparing Single-Sex and Reformed 
Coeducation: A Constitutional Analysis, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 725, 731 (2012) 
(finding that single-sex education programs are “clearly unconstitutional under the 
Supreme Court’s thirty-year-plus line of equal protection cases” analyzing sex-class 
isolations); Cohen & Levit, supra note 9, at 340 (arguing that single-sex education is 
“fundamentally discriminatory, and patently unconstitutional” because the 
heightened standard of review employed by the Court leads to the conclusion that 
single-sex education violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 83. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 84. See id. at 197.  
 85. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980); 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979).  
 86. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204. 
 87. See id. at 201-04 (“[T]he showing offered by the appellees does not 
satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of 
drinking and driving.”). 
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In reviewing sex classifications under the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, the Supreme Court has consistently enforced certain 
guidelines.88 States must show how the sex-class isolation furthers 
their interest, namely how the states’ treating the sexes differently 
allows the states to achieve their objective.89 Further, the Supreme 
Court has historically been very skeptical of sex classifications based 
on overbroad generalizations or stereotypes, despite the evidence on 
which they may rest.90 Apart from enforcing these guidelines, 
however, the Supreme Court’s application of the intermediate 
scrutiny standard has been inconsistent.91 
2. The “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard of 
Review 
The Supreme Court’s application of the intermediate scrutiny 
standard has ranged from applying a more demanding intermediate 
scrutiny standard in some cases to adopting a more relaxed 
intermediate scrutiny standard in others.92 The Supreme Court first 
used the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language in analyzing 
state sex classifications in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney.93 In that case, the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute 
that provided preferential hiring treatment to veterans who applied 
for civil service jobs.94 The Court found that the statute was not 
discriminatory against women even though the vast majority of 
Massachusetts’s veterans were male.95 The Court relied on Craig v. 
Boren in applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, but also noted 
that any statute preferring one sex over the other “require[s] an 
exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional 
challenge.”96 
                                                     
 88. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 203-04. 
 90. See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150-52; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 
207 (1977). 
 91. See infra Subsections I.D.2-3.  
 92. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (applying 
a more demanding intermediate scrutiny standard), with Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 
53, 73 (2001) (applying a more relaxed intermediate scrutiny standard). 
 93. 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). 
 94. See id. at 259, 281. 
 95. See id. at 281 (“The appellee . . . failed to demonstrate that the law in 
any way reflects a purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex.”). Over 98% of 
Massachusetts veterans were male; 1.8% were female. See id. at 270. 
 96. Id. at 273. 
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In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Supreme 
Court for the first time comprehensively adopted the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” language into its intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review.97 In this case, the Court held Mississippi’s 
woman-only, state-run nursing school unconstitutional under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard.98 Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority, enunciated the standard as requiring an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for a sex classification.99 This burden could 
only be met if the state established that its classification served an 
important government interest and that the means it used were 
“substantially related” to the achievement of its interest.100 
The Court’s adoption of a more demanding standard ultimately 
proved fatal for Mississippi University for Women’s (MUW) all-
women admissions policy.101 First, the Court found that Mississippi’s 
objective of using an all-female admissions policy to remedy past 
discrimination against women was not legitimate because it furthered 
the stereotype that nursing was a woman’s profession.102 Further, the 
Court argued that the admissions policy had not actually been 
adopted for that purpose because no evidence of that purpose existed 
in the legislative history of the statute establishing the admissions 
policy.103 Second, in analyzing whether Mississippi’s sex 
classification was substantially related to its alleged objective, the 
Court required Mississippi to show that its admission policy was 
necessary in every instance to achieve its objective of remedying 
past discrimination.104 Because the Court found that men auditing the 
nursing classes105 in the school did not “adversely” affect women’s 
academic performance or the school’s teaching style, MUW’s 
female-only admissions policy was not “necessary to reach any of 
MUW’s educational goals” and therefore had no “exceedingly 
persuasive justification.”106 
                                                     
 97. 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
 98. See id. at 731. 
 99. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); 
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 
273). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
 102. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727-30. 
 103. See id. at 730 n.16. 
 104. See id. at 730.  
 105. Men were allowed to attend and fully participate in classes at the 
college, but not enroll for credit. See id. at 721. 
 106. Id. at 730-31. 
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Four Justices dissented from the Court’s holding.107 In their 
dissents, these Justices expressed strong disapproval of what they 
perceived to be the Court’s heightening of the standard of review 
applicable to sex classifications.108 The dissenting Justices would 
have upheld MUW’s single-sex admissions system as constitutional, 
describing the Court’s holding as preventing states from providing 
men and women with choice and diversity in education.109 While the 
Hogan Court incorporated the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
language into its standard of review,110 the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Virginia officially adopted this language as central to its 
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard.111 Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the majority, established the standard as requiring states 
to provide “an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” for their sex 
classification.112 However, instead of labeling this standard 
intermediate scrutiny, Justice Ginsburg labeled it “skeptical 
scrutiny”113 and proceeded to use this phrase as the “core instruction” 
of the Court’s analytical framework.114 Thus, the Court required 
Virginia to provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the 
Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) single-sex admission policy and 
show that it was necessary in order for the State to train its “citizen‒
soldiers.”115  
Virginia provided two justifications for its single-sex 
admissions policy.116 First, Virginia claimed that its single-sex 
education program was justified because it provided a diverse 
educational approach.117 Second, Virginia argued that admitting 
women would require a modification of the school’s “adversative 
                                                     
 107. Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 
735 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 108. See id. at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 109. See id. at 741 (describing the majority’s holding as “frustrat[ing] the 
liberating spirit of the Equal Protection Clause[ and] prohibit[ing] the States from 
providing women with an opportunity to choose the type of university they prefer”). 
 110. See id. at 724 (majority opinion). 
 111. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996). 
 112. Id. at 530.  
 113. Id. at 531. 
 114. See id. Not only was this phrase central to the Court’s analysis, but as 
Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the Virginia majority used the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” phrase nine times in its opinion. See id. at 571 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 115. See id. at 540-46 (majority opinion). VMI used the term “citizen-
soldiers” to describe its graduates. See id. at 521-22. 
 116. See id. at 535. 
 117. See id. 
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method,”118 which it used to train its students to become citizen‒
soldiers.119  
However, the Court dismissed both of Virginia’s proposed 
justifications.120 With regard to the State’s first alleged objective,121 
the Court found that Virginia had not established VMI to provide a 
diversity of educational opportunities because of its history of 
providing women with inferior educational opportunities and 
excluding them from higher education.122 The Court likewise rejected 
Virginia’s second justification that admitting women would destroy 
its adversative program.123 The Court found that because some 
women might desire to attend VMI and some women would be 
capable of excelling there, Virginia did not meet its burden of 
proving that excluding women was necessary to train citizen‒
soldiers.124 Thus, because VMI’s exclusion of women was not 
necessary for Virginia to train its citizen–soldiers, it failed to provide 
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its sex classification.125  
Although six Justices joined Justice Ginsburg in the Virginia 
holding, Justice Rehnquist concurred separately.126 He argued that the 
Court should have confined its use of this language to restate the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, as the Feeney Court had done.127 
Further, he expressed strong disapproval of the Court’s use of the 
                                                     
 118. VMI’s adversative method consisted of “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, 
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, 
and indoctrination in desirable values.” See id. at 522 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)).  
 119. See id. at 535. 
 120. See id. at 535-43. 
 121. See id. at 539-40. 
 122. See id. at 535-38 (“Neither recent nor distant history bears out 
Virginia’s alleged pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational options.”).  
 123. See id. at 541-43 (“The notion that admission of women would 
downgrade VMI’s stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the 
school, is a judgment hardly proved, a prediction . . . once routinely used to deny 
rights or opportunities.”). 
 124. See id. at 540-42 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 
1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)). In so doing, the majority dismissed out of hand the district 
court’s factual finding that Virginia’s expert testimony describing VMI as 
“pedagogically justifiable” was sound. See id. at 540.  
 125. See id. at 534.  
 126. See id. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 127. See id. at 559 (arguing that the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
language “is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of 
meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself”). 
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phrase, arguing it introduced “uncertainty” and “confusion” to the 
test applicable to sex classifications.128  
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, dissented from the Court’s 
holding, arguing that VMI’s single-sex admissions policy was 
constitutional.129 He viewed the majority as using the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” language to heighten the intermediate 
scrutiny standard to a test closer to strict scrutiny.130 As a result, 
Justice Scalia believed single-sex education was left “functionally 
dead.”131 Despite the large majority that the Court’s opinion 
commanded in Virginia, its holding stands in sharp contrast with 
other cases applying a less demanding standard of review.132 
3. The Traditional Intermediate Scrutiny Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court has analyzed other cases involving sex-
class isolations under a less demanding standard; namely, the 
traditional intermediate scrutiny standard.133 In Nguyen v. INS, the 
Supreme Court examined a law requiring only fathers, and not 
mothers, of out-of-wedlock children born outside the United States 
to take the first step toward acquiring United States citizenship for 
the child.134 Here, the Court held that this law passed the traditional 
intermediate scrutiny test.135 First, the Court found that the statute 
furthered the important governmental objectives of providing for a 
“biological parent-child relationship” and ensuring that relationship 
consisted of “real, everyday ties” among the child, parent, and the 
United States.136 Second, the Court found that the means Congress 
used were substantially related to its objectives.137 The Court 
reasoned that various other naturalization statutory provisions 
                                                     
 128. See id. at 559-60. 
 129. See id. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. See id. at 568 (“I have no problem with a system of abstract tests . . . 
though I think we can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate 
scrutiny whenever we feel like it.” (internal parentheses omitted)). 
 131. See id. at 596-97 (“The enemies of single-sex education have won; by 
persuading only seven Justices (five would have been enough) that their view of the 
world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have effectively imposed that view on 
all 50 States.”). 
 132. See infra Subsection I.D.3. 
 133. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 134. 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001). 
 135. See id. at 73.  
 136. See id. at 62, 64-65. 
 137. See id. at 68-69. 
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already required parents to take action to link their nonmajority age 
children to the United States, and the statute provided for an “easily 
administered scheme” to advance the development of a parent‒child 
relationship.138  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied on the 
traditional intermediate scrutiny standard and failed to incorporate 
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language into the Court’s 
enunciation of that standard.139 The Court acknowledged that sex-
neutral alternatives existed140 but dismissed these alternatives.141 The 
Court’s reasoning emphasized that “[n]one of our gender-based 
classification equal protection cases have required that the statute 
under consideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate 
objective in every instance.”142 
Similarly, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court found that a male-
only draft registration survived the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
test.143 First, because the federal government only allowed men to 
serve in combat positions, the draft registration furthered the 
important governmental objective of providing the pool of men from 
which combat troops could be selected.144 Second, the Court held that 
the sex classification was “closely related to Congress’ purpose in 
authorizing registration,”145 despite the fact that combat-ineligible 
men were required to register146 and noncombat positions were 
available for women as well.147 The Court reasoned that the draft 
registration was not required to achieve its objective of providing 
combat-ready men in every instance because Congress may simply 
have found the added costs of requiring women to register for the 
draft to be excessive.148  
                                                     
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. at 60. 
 140. See id. at 69. The Court found that Congress could have mandated an 
actual relationship between the child and parent, or exempted parents and children 
who already had a relationship. See id. 
 141. See id. The Court reasoned that Congress may have found these 
alternatives to be too subjective, intrusive, and difficult to prove. See id. 
 142. See id. at 70.  
 143. 453 U.S. 57, 78-81 (1981). While the Court did not explicitly state the 
intermediate scrutiny standard in this case, its citations to cases such as Craig v. 
Boren in reaching its holding exemplify its application of that standard. See id. at 79. 
 144. Id. at 78-79.  
 145. Id. at 79.  
 146. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1573 (2d ed. 
1988). 
 147. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 148. See id. at 81 (majority opinion). 
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As a result of this line of cases, the Supreme Court’s 
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard in assessing the 
constitutionality of single-sex-class isolations in general has been 
described as “vague, poorly defined and malleable, providing 
insufficient guidance in individual cases and giving broad discretion 
to individual judges.”149 Additionally, the constitutionality of single-
sex education has come into question because the Supreme Court 
ruled against single-sex education on both occasions in which the 
Court addressed it.150 Meanwhile, lower federal courts have declined 
to apply the “exceedingly persuasive justification” intermediate 
scrutiny standard with the same amount of rigor as the Virginia and 
Hogan Courts, and in some cases, even failed to rely on that standard 
in analyzing single-sex educational programs.151 
4. Recent Developments 
Lower federal courts have consistently held that single-sex 
classes are not per se unconstitutional.152 In A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. 
Breckenridge County Board of Education,153 the Western District of 
Kentucky held that a public school offering optional single-sex 
classes did not constitute sex discrimination because a school’s 
separation of students based on their sex was not a constitutional 
injury.154 The court failed to even enunciate the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” standard of review, summarizing the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area as never having held that 
public single-sex education programs or schools were per se 
unconstitutional.155 Rather, the court argued that the applicable law 
                                                     
 149. Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: 
Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 
36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1213 (2005) (condensing lower courts, scholars, and Justice 
Souter’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing critiques of the intermediate scrutiny 
standard). 
 150. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982). 
 151. See infra Subsection I.D.4. 
 152. See infra notes 153, 166 and accompanying text. 
 153. 833 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (W.D. Ky. 2011). 
 154. See id. (“[T]he separation of students by sex does not give rise to a 
finding of constitutional injury as a matter of law.”). 
 155. See id. (“The Supreme Court has never held that separating students by 
sex in a public school . . . or offering a single-sex public institution is per se 
unconstitutional.”). 
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did not prevent a public school from having coed and single-sex 
classrooms.156  
Additionally, lower federal courts since Virginia have not 
required absolute equality of opportunity for both sexes with regard 
to single-sex education.157 For example, in Myers v. Simpson, the 
Eastern District of Virginia held that a county offering sexual assault 
and rape awareness classes exclusively to women did not constitute 
sex discrimination and met the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
test established by the Supreme Court for sex-based classifications.158 
The court relied on the fact that the government could compensate 
women for past economic impediments and provide economic 
opportunities for them.159 Similarly, in Reach Academy for Boys and 
Girls, Inc. v. Delaware Department of Education, the District of 
Delaware granted a preliminary injunction requiring that the 
Delaware Department of Education renew the charter for an all-girls 
charter school.160 The court’s reasoning centered on the fact that the 
Department of Education had likely violated the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title IX by not renewing the charter for the all-girls 
school, but renewing the charter for the all-boys school.161 However, 
the court acknowledged that its holding rested on the state’s failing 
to consider new applications for single-sex schools, not on the fact 
that the state only had an all-boys school and not an all-girls 
school.162  
In line with Title IX requirements, lower federal courts have 
consistently held that single-sex education programs must be 
                                                     
 156. See id. (arguing that the theory that “the coexistence of coed and single-
sex classrooms in schools constitutes sex discrimination . . . finds no support . . . in 
law”). 
 157. See, e.g., Reach Acad. for Boys & Girls, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Educ., 
46 F. Supp. 3d 455, 476-77 (D. Del. 2014) (granting preliminary injunction); Myers 
v. Simpson, 831 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 (E.D. Va. 2011).  
 158. 831 F. Supp. 2d at 951. 
 159. See id. at 950 (“[G]overnments can use sex-based classifications to . . . 
compensate women for economic disadvantages they have suffered, promote 
employment opportunity, and ‘advance full development of the talent and capacities 
of our Nation’s people.’” (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 
(1996))).   
 160. 46 F. Supp. 3d at 476-77 (granting preliminary injunction). 
 161. Id. at 472, 474. 
 162. Id. at 472 n.12 (“[T]he State could lawfully fund two all-boys schools 
and only one all-girls school; it may also . . . lawfully fund one all-boys school and 
no all-girls schools, so long as the State [is] willing to entertain new applications for 
single-sex charter schools.”). 
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voluntary.163 In Doe v. Wood County Board of Education,164 the 
Southern District of West Virginia granted a preliminary injunction 
on participation by West Virginia middle-school students in single-
sex classes because the participation was not completely voluntary, 
which the court found violated the Title IX requirements of such 
classes.165 However, in emphasizing that its ruling rested only on the 
fact that the single-sex classes were not completely voluntary, the 
court explicitly adopted the Western District of Kentucky’s position 
in A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. that “the separation of students by sex does 
not give rise to a finding of constitutional injury as a matter of 
law.”166 Rather, the court emphasized that if the classes meet the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” standard established by 
Virginia, then “single-sex classes can certainly be constitutional.”167 
Thus, lower federal courts post-Virginia have consistently held that 
single-sex programs and schools may, indeed, be constitutional, 
especially if the school at issue can demonstrate that its program is 
distinguishable from the admissions policies under review in Hogan 
and Virginia.168 In order to meet the Virginia standard of review, 
single-sex schools thus face the determination of whether the 
constitutional theories undergirding this standard justify their sex 
classifications.169 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES UNDERGIRDING THE VIRGINIA 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Supporters of the Virginia and Hogan decisions lauded the 
advent of the “exceedingly persuasive justification” standard as 
applied to single-sex education as indispensable in preventing the 
harmful effects of sex discrimination.170 These scholars relied on the 
                                                     
 163. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 164. 888 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D. W. Va. 2012). 
 165. See id. at 777-78.  
 166. Id. at 778-79 (quoting A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckenridge Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (W.D. Ky. 2011)).  
 167. Id. at 779.  
 168. See supra notes 153-62, 164-67.  
 169. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., 
Panel Discussion at the Washington College of Law of American University (Apr. 8, 
1996), in Centennial Panel: Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: Evaluating 
Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 24 (1997); Deborah L. 
Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 35, 36 (1997); 
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sex-equity theories of formal equality and antisubordination, arguing 
that under the Virginia standard of review, single-sex education was 
only constitutional if it met those theories’ criteria.171 Conversely, 
opponents of single-sex education have also used these theories to 
argue that single-sex education is effectively unconstitutional under 
the Virginia standard.172 
Some scholars supporting single-sex education under the 
Virginia standard of review have justified single-sex education under 
the theory of formal equality.173 This theory posits that similarly 
situated individuals should be treated in similar ways.174 Thus, with 
regard to single-sex education, supporters under the formal equality 
theory emphasize that single-sex schools are only constitutional if 
they provide equal choices to boys and girls.175 These scholars point 
to the Virginia Court’s emphasis on the fact that increasing the 
diversity of educational options open to students may be a legitimate 
objective of single-sex education only if that objective is carried out 
evenhandedly.176  
Conversely, those opposing single-sex education under the 
formal equality theory argue that single-sex schools are 
unconstitutional because they are inherently unequal and 
                                                                                                                
Margo L. Ely, Court’s VMI Decision Reinforces Review Standard for Sex Bias, CHI. 
DAILY L. BULL., July 8, 1996, at 6. 
 171. See Martha Minow, Remarks, Fostering Capacity, Equality, and 
Responsibility (and Single-Sex Education): In Honor of Linda McClain, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 818 (2005) (arguing that the single-sex education debate 
“reflect[s] the debates over whether gender equality calls for treating males and 
females the same, or instead attending to differences between them”). 
 172. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 2; Brian Johnson, Admitting That 
Women’s Only Public Education is Unconstitutional and Advancing the Equality of 
the Sexes, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 88 (2002); Lucille M. Ponte, United States v. 
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 173. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 171, at 818; Michael Heise, Are Single-Sex 
Schools Inherently Unequal?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244 (2004). 
 174. See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 117 (3d ed. 2002). 
 175. See Gary J. Simson, Separate but Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 443, 451 (2005); Heise, supra note 173, at 1244. 
 176. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S 515, 534 n.7 (1996) (stating that the 
Court “do[es] not question the Commonwealth’s prerogative evenhandedly to 
support diverse educational opportunities”);  cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (holding that a Cleveland, Ohio voucher program allowing 
students to choose between private and public schools was constitutional). 
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discriminatory.177 These scholars often emphasize the history of sex 
discrimination in the United States, arguing that single-sex male 
schools have always enjoyed more resources than single-sex female 
schools.178 However, on both sides of the debate, scholars espousing 
the formal equality theory view equality of the sexes as occupying 
paramount importance.179 
Other scholars have relied on the theory of antisubordination, 
under which the inquiry turns on “‘not whether women are like, or 
unlike, men, but whether a rule or practice serves to subordinate 
women to men.’”180 Those espousing the antisubordination argument 
maintain that single-sex schools are constitutional under the Virginia 
standard of review if they serve the purpose of remedying past 
discrimination against women.181 The central question, according to 
this theory, is whether single-sex education benefits or harms 
women.182 Scholars advocating this theory point to several examples 
in the Court’s case law where the Court has allowed sex 
classifications that remedy past discrimination against women.183    
Finally, an alternative approach provides for a modification of 
the Virginia standard of review based on the factors of voluntariness 
and equal opportunity.184 According to this approach, the “strictness” 
of the intermediate scrutiny test should be calibrated based on the 
                                                     
 177. See Levit, supra note 48, at 521; see also Johnson, supra note 172,       
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important governmental objective.”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976) 
(finding that earlier sex classifications were upheld because they remedied 
“disadvantageous conditions suffered by women in economic and military life” 
(citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 
(1974))); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (recognizing the “long 
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” in the United States). 
 184. See Jenkins, supra note 11, at 1960-61. 
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measure to which the scrutinized programs or schools meet the 
voluntariness and equal opportunity factors.185 In assessing 
“involuntary schools” or schools without “equal opportunities,” the 
intermediate scrutiny test should be more demanding, while in 
assessing voluntary schools or equal opportunity schools, the 
intermediate scrutiny test should be less demanding.186 The 
prevalence of these constitutional theories187 and the disparate 
standards of review that the Supreme Court has used in analyzing the 
constitutionality of single-sex education188 belie the fact that the 
constitutionality of single-sex education remains undetermined.189 
These concerns can be addressed by the Supreme Court’s 
reaffirmation of its adherence to the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
standard for analyzing sex classifications.190 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF REAFFIRMING THE SUPREME COURT’S 
ADHERENCE TO THE TRADITIONAL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
STANDARD 
Although many scholars supported the Virginia and Hogan 
Courts’ decisions to heighten the standard of review applicable to 
state sex classifications, others decried the advent of the elevated 
standard, particularly for its perceived detrimental effect on single-
sex education.191 Several reasons exist for the Supreme Court to 
reaffirm its commitment to the traditional standard of review.192 First, 
the Virginia and Hogan decisions heightened the standard of review 
applicable to state sex classifications.193 Second, the Virginia and 
Hogan decisions diverged from prior precedent.194 Finally, there are 
several policy reasons against the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
Virginia standard of review.195 As such, precedent and policy call for 
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 186. See id. at 2022, 2026. 
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the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the applicability of the 
traditional intermediate scrutiny standard to single-sex education.196 
A. The Virginia and Hogan Decisions Heightened the Standard of 
Review Applicable to Sex-Based Classifications 
It is important for the Supreme Court to reaffirm its adherence 
to the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing sex 
classifications because the Virginia and Hogan Courts heightened 
that standard.197 This is particularly imperative because the Virginia 
and Hogan Courts ostensibly applied traditional intermediate 
scrutiny,198 distorting the true nature of the standard applied in these 
cases.199 The Virginia and Hogan Courts heightened the standard of 
review applicable to state sex-class isolations by: (1) requiring a 
perfect fit between the means the state used and the end it sought; (2) 
placing inordinate emphasis on the “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” language; and (3) rigorously scrutinizing the states’ 
alleged objectives.200  
In both Virginia and Hogan, the Court required the respective 
states to show that their sex-class isolations were necessary to 
achieve the state’s important objective in every instance.201 In other 
words, the Virginia and Hogan Courts held VMI and MUW to a 
standard requiring a perfect fit between the means used and ends 
sought (the states’ respective statutes could not inappropriately over- 
                                                     
 196. See infra Sections III.B-C (discussing the precedential and policy 
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 199. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 573-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority applied the strict scrutiny standard of review even though “[t]here is simply 
no support in our cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless 
it relates to characteristics that hold true in every instance”); Candace Saari Kovacic-
Fleischer, United States v. Virginia’s New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with 
Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 883 
(1997) (noting that “by requiring VMI to make institutional adjustments to admit 
qualified women, the Court . . . elevated equal protection analysis to the level of . . . 
strict scrutiny”). 
 200. See infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text. 
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or under-include basically anyone).202 For example, the Virginia 
Court relied on the fact “that some women may prefer [the 
adversative method] to the methodology a women’s college might 
pursue” in finding VMI’s all-male admissions policy 
unconstitutional.203 Likewise, under strict scrutiny, a law that under-
included some women would be unconstitutional based on its failure 
to be “narrowly tailored” to “further compelling governmental 
interests.”204 Therefore, the Virginia Court’s reliance on the fact that 
some women could prefer VMI’s adversative method required 
Virginia’s statute to have a near perfect means-ends relationship in 
order to survive the Court’s review, which is exactly what strict 
scrutiny would have required.205 
The Virginia and Hogan Courts also heightened the standard of 
review by placing inordinate emphasis on the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” language in their formulations of the 
intermediate scrutiny test.206 As such, the Court gave this language its 
own separate meaning.207 Instead of using this phrase to describe the 
difficulty in meeting the test applicable to the respective cases, the 
Virginia and Hogan Courts used the phrase to define the test itself.208 
Further, the Virginia and Hogan Courts elevated the standard 
of review by rigorously scrutinizing the respective states’ proffered 
governmental objectives with regard to the sex classifications at 
issue.209 In both Hogan and Virginia, the Court second-guessed and 
ultimately dismissed the states’ proffered objectives, finding that the 
statutes at issue were not adopted for their alleged purposes.210 
Rather, the Virginia and Hogan Courts found the respective state 
objectives to be based on stereotypes and overbroad 
generalizations.211 For example, in Hogan, the Court found that 
Mississippi’s alleged objective of using an all-female admissions 
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 203. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540. 
 204. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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policy to remedy past discrimination against women was not its true 
objective because no evidence of that purpose existed in the 
legislative history of the statute establishing the admissions policy.212 
Further, the Hogan Court found that this objective was not legitimate 
because it furthered the stereotype that nursing was a woman’s 
profession.213 Because strict scrutiny also requires the law at issue to 
“further compelling governmental interests,”214 the Virginia and 
Hogan Courts’ rigorous scrutiny of states’ proposed governmental 
objectives is reminiscent of strict scrutiny.215 
Finally, even those supporting the Virginia holding have 
acknowledged that Virginia’s “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
standard of review “heighten[ed] the level of scrutiny and [brought] 
it closer to . . . ‘strict scrutiny.’”216 The Virginia decision has further 
been characterized as “rule-free” and a move “in the direction of 
open-ended balancing.”217 However, the Virginia and Hogan Courts’ 
heightening of this standard lacks a basis in Supreme Court 
precedent.218 
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But see Larry Cata Backer, Reading Entrail: Romer, VMI and the Art of Divining 
Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361, 369 (1997) (arguing that the Virginia Court’s 
standard of review did not heighten the level of scrutiny applicable to sex 
classifications).  
 217. Sunstein, supra note 216, at 78, 81.  
 218. See infra Section III.A. 
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B. The Virginia Standard of Review, as Applied to Single-Sex 
Education, Lacks Support in the Supreme Court’s Precedent 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his lone dissent from the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Virginia, the Virginia standard of 
review, as applied to single-sex education, “contradicts the reasoning 
of . . . other precedents.”219 First, even outside the education field, 
prior to Virginia, the Supreme Court had never required that a sex-
based classification meet its objective in every possible scenario, but 
only required that it further its objective “‘in the aggregate.’”220 
Second, the Virginia and Hogan Courts’ intensive reliance on the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” language to increase the 
demanding nature of the standard of review has no support in 
precedent.221 Third, the Court’s rigorous scrutiny of Virginia’s and 
Mississippi’s proposed governmental objectives is not justified on 
precedential grounds.222 
1. The Virginia Court’s Requirement That VMI Meet Its 
Objective in Every Instance Is Not Supported by Precedent 
The Virginia Court’s reasoning that VMI’s admissions policy 
was unconstitutional because “a single woman” could very well be 
interested in attending VMI223 encounters no support in the Supreme 
Court’s precedent.224 For instance, in Craig v. Boren, the Court found 
the state’s statutory sex-based differentiation of the cut-off age for 
buying alcohol to be overwhelmingly over-inclusive and under-
inclusive because it improperly affected many alcohol-buying men.225 
Thus, the Court in Craig v. Boren faulted the state’s sex-based 
classification not for failing to meet its objective in every instance, 
but rather because it failed to do so in many instances.226 Conversely, 
in Virginia, the Court failed to make any such finding.227 Rather, the 
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Virginia Court merely relied on the fact that some undetermined 
small number of women could prefer the “adversative method” that 
VMI offered, and therefore, Virginia’s statute did not meet its 
objective in every instance.228 As such, the Virginia Court’s holding 
VMI’s admissions policy unconstitutional for failing to meet its 
objective in every instance is not supported by precedent.229   
Contrary to the Virginia Court’s holding, the Supreme Court’s 
precedent strongly supports the rule that the strict scrutiny standard 
is not applicable to sex-based classifications.230 As the Virginia Court 
itself even acknowledged, Supreme Court precedent “thus far 
reserve[s] most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on 
race or national origin.”231 Five years after the Virginia decision, the 
Nguyen Court applied a much less demanding intermediate scrutiny 
than the Virginia and Hogan Courts.232 While in Virginia the Court 
required the sex classification to achieve its objective in basically 
every instance,233 the Court in Nguyen explicitly stated that “[n]one 
of our gender-based classification equal protection cases have 
required that the statute under consideration must be capable of 
achieving its ultimate objective in every instance.”234 Thus, the 
Nguyen Court officially authorized a state’s sex classification’s 
inability to meet its objective in every instance.235 Further, the state 
statute at issue in Nguyen was facially discriminatory,236 which made 
it all the more surprising that the Court upheld it under the traditional 
intermediate scrutiny standard.237  
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In Rostker, the Court likewise only required the state statute’s 
means to be substantially related to the achievement of an important 
government purpose, not to achieve this purpose in every possible 
instance.238 In this case, the government’s distinguishing between 
men and women in its draft requirement was not necessary in every 
instance in order to meets its objective in providing combat-ready 
troops.239 Further, the Rostker Court held that even if some women 
could serve in noncombat roles in the army, women could still be 
constitutionally excluded from the federal government’s selective-
service registration plans.240 The Court simply deferred to Congress’s 
judgment that the burdens involved in adding women to draft and 
registration plans were too egregious.241  
The nature of the Rostker decision, namely the Court’s review 
of a congressional decision involving military affairs, fails to account 
for the Court’s application of the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
standard to this case.242 A prominent scholarly interpretation of 
Rostker is that it simply represents an instance where the Court 
deferred to Congress’s wishes because the statute at issue involved 
military affairs.243 However, while the Rostker Court did emphasize 
Congress’s unique role under the Constitution to “raise and support 
armies,” the Court explicitly stated that its precedent “d[oes] not 
purport to apply a different equal protection test [than the traditional 
intermediate scrutiny test] because of the military context.”244 As 
such, the Rostker Court did not apply a more deferential test because 
of its military context.245    
It is also illogical to argue that the Court in Virginia confronted 
a “unique” situation requiring the application of a stricter form of 
scrutiny than the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard.246 As 
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, a single-sex educational program 
will always be unique in some sense; a single-sex educational 
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program that is not unique would itself be unique.247 Further, 
regardless of how the Supreme Court may characterize a decision, 
every one of its dispositions establishes precedent and provides 
rationale that lower courts are bound to follow.248 Therefore, the 
Virginia decision does not represent a “unique” disposition that has 
no bearing on the current law relating to single-sex education.249 
2. The Virginia and Hogan Courts’ Use of the “Exceedingly 
Persuasive Justification” Phrase Is Not Justified on 
Precedential Grounds. 
The Virginia and Hogan Courts’ use of the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” phrase to define the intermediate scrutiny 
test, rather than to describe the test, also altered the Court’s long-
standing precedent.250 The first case in which the Supreme Court 
used the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language supports the 
fact that the introduction of this language was not intended to make 
the intermediate scrutiny test more demanding.251 In Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court upheld, rather 
than invalidated, the state statute at issue.252 This strongly suggests 
that the Court did not envision the “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” language to be as demanding as Virginia and Hogan 
held it to be.253  
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As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his Virginia concurrence, 
the phrase “exceedingly persuasive” was originally used simply as an 
“observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test.”254 It 
was not supposed to be “a formulation of the test itself.”255 In fact, 
the later Nguyen decision can be seen as an attempt by the Court to 
shift its sex classification analysis framework away from the Virginia 
standard of review to its earlier formulation of the test.256 In contrast 
with the Virginia and Hogan Courts’ singular emphasis on the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” language in its formulation of 
the standard of review applicable to those cases,257 the Nguyen Court 
mentioned the phrase only twice and failed to identify this language 
as central to its analysis.258 
3. The Virginia and Hogan Courts’ Rigorous Scrutiny of the 
States’ Proffered Governmental Interests Conflicts with 
Prior Precedent 
The Virginia and Hogan Courts’ rigorous scrutiny of the states’ 
proffered governmental objectives for the sex classifications at issue 
also conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent.259 In both Hogan 
and Virginia, the Court second-guessed and ultimately dismissed the 
states’ proffered objectives, finding that the statutes at issue were not 
adopted for their alleged purposes, but were rather based on 
stereotypes and overbroad generalizations.260 Conversely, in Nguyen, 
the Court found that the statute at issue was not based on stereotypes, 
despite the petitioners’ and dissenters’ allegations to the contrary.261 
Rather, the Court accepted the respondent’s argument that the statute 
was based on biological realities262 and did not engage in any second-
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guessing or rigorous scrutiny to determine if the government’s 
alleged objective actually was its true objective.263   
Instead of an intense scrutiny of states’ proffered educational 
objectives, the Supreme Court’s precedent provides for a 
longstanding history of deference to states and local school districts 
in making educational decisions and furthering educational 
objectives.264 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the “local 
autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.”265 The 
Court’s rationale in providing this autonomy to school districts is 
that educators are better informed about facts on the ground and have 
more expertise than federal judges in making educational 
decisions.266 While this history of deference should not provide states 
and local school districts with a free hand to enact sex classifications 
at will, it does call for federal courts to at least provide local school 
districts with the opportunity to experiment with single-sex 
educational options.267 
The Supreme Court chose to use the intermediate scrutiny 
standard to review government-sponsored sex classifications to 
prevent sexual stereotyping.268 In the vast majority of cases, single-
sex education programs do not perpetuate such stereotypes, but 
rather, in many instances, provide additional choices and 
                                                                                                                
and ensuring that relationship consisted of “real, everyday ties” among the child, 
parent, and the United States. See id. at 62, 65. 
 263. See id. at 62-64. 
 264. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“[P]ublic education 
in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not 
and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation 
of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values.”). 
 265. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); see also 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (“States and local school boards are 
generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools.”). 
 266. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985). 
 267. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of 
Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 832, 
848-49 (2000); Morgan, supra note 41, at 423; Barnes, supra note 191, at 545; 
Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching for the Silver Lining: Constructing a 
Nonremedial yet “Exceedingly Persuasive” Rationale for Single-Sex Educational 
Programs in Public Schools, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 367, 398-400 (2001). Barnes shows 
how the Virginia Court’s second-guessing states’ alleged objectives in reviewing 
state statutes forces states to legislate in a manner similar to the way in which 
regulations are enacted under the Administrative Procedure Act, where states must 
enumerate the purposes and objectives of every classification statute. See Barnes, 
supra note 191, at 545. 
 268. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). 
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opportunities to disadvantaged men and women.269 Thus, the Court 
should not heighten the intermediate scrutiny standard in an effort to 
invalidate state actions designed to expand men and women’s
choices where the parties at issue often have substantially equal 
opportunities.270
As Justice Powell noted in his Hogan dissent, the Court thwarts 
the liberating effect of the Equal Protection Clause when it uses the 
Virginia standard of review in contradiction of its precedent.271 The 
Court prevents states from providing both men and women with the 
choice of educational options.272 Across the board, the petitioners in 
lawsuits against single-sex schools do not argue that the state is 
depriving them of a substantive education or even the right to attend 
a single-sex or coeducational school.273 The petitioners do not 
complain that they are discriminated against because they cannot 
attend a single-sex school open to their respective sex.274 Rather, they 
seek to attend a specific school for their personal convenience.275
Thus, if the Court seeks to remain true to its sex-based equal 
protection doctrine, it should reaffirm its commitment to traditional 
intermediate scrutiny and not heighten its standard of review.276
                                                     
269. See supra Section I.B. 
270. Cf. supra Section I.B. 
271. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 741 (1982) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (deciding 
whether women’s exclusion from VMI in particular denies them the equal 
protection of the laws); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 741-42 (“[Petitioner’s] claim . . . is not 
that he is being denied a substantive educational opportunity, or even the right to 
attend an all-male or a coeducational college . . . [but] only that the colleges open to 
him are located at inconvenient distances.”); Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 
880, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he deprivation asserted is that of the opportunity to 
attend a specific school, not that of an opportunity to obtain an education at a school 
with comparable educational facilities, faculty and prestige.”). 
274. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
275. See id. 
276. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 574-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia 
argued in his Virginia dissent: 
The Court’s intimations [about adopting strict scrutiny for sex 
classifications] are particularly out of place because it is perfectly clear 
that, if the question of the applicable standard of review for sex-based 
classifications were to be regarded as an appropriate subject for 
reconsideration, the stronger argument would be not for elevating the 
standard to strict scrutiny, but for reducing it to rational-basis review. 
Id. 
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In summary, the Virginia standard of review represents a 
departure from the Court’s equal protection precedent as applied to 
sex classifications in general and single-sex education in particular.277
For this reason, it is important to understand how the Virginia
standard of review would impact single-sex education.278 An 
examination of the policy implications of the Virginia standard of 
review is therefore warranted.279
C. The Virginia Standard of Review, as Applied to Single-Sex 
Education, Lacks Support in Public Policy 
The potential detrimental effects of the Virginia standard of 
review on education in general and single-sex education in particular 
are numerous, and therefore several public policy reasons exist for 
the Court to return to the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard.280
The Virginia standard of review (1) hinders experimentation in 
education; (2) precludes states from following research showing that 
single-sex schools benefit students; and (3) prevents states from 
using single-sex schools to remedy past or present discrimination 
against particular groups.281 Further, the constitutional theories that 
serve as the foundation of the Virginia standard of review lack 
support in educational policy.282
1. The Policy Arguments Against the Virginia Standard of
Review
As Justice Scalia noted in his Virginia dissent, a court’s
application of the Virginia standard of review to single-sex public 
education programs or schools would leave the concept of single-sex 
education “functionally dead.”283 Like in Virginia and Hogan, a state 
277. See supra notes 219, 251-55 and accompanying text. 
278. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he enemies of 
single-sex education have won; by persuading only seven Justices (five would have 
been enough) that their view of the world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have 
effectively imposed that view on all 50 States.”).
279. See infra Section III.C. 
280. See infra Subsection III.C.1. 
281. See infra Subsection III.C.1. 
282. See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
283. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 573-74. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Hogan,
similarly noted that the majority’s holding in that case “place[d] in constitutional 
jeopardy any state-supported educational institution that confines its student body in 
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attempting to experiment with single-sex education would be 
required to establish that the single-sex educational program at issue 
is necessary in every instance in order to further the state’s important 
objective.284 As shown in the Virginia and Hogan cases, this is a 
practically insurmountable burden for a state to meet.285
For example, like the single-sex school at issue in Garrett, a 
state may wish to improve the plight of its poor, minority, urban girls 
by experimenting with an all-girls school in a poor, urban area.286
However, because of the stringent nature of the Virginia standard of 
review, the state will likely get sued for discriminating against urban 
boys as soon as it begins to implement this experiment.287 The 
indeterminate, yet exacting nature of the standard (requiring an
“exceedingly persuasive justification”) invites litigation by those 
opposed to single-sex education.288 School districts fearing the risks 
of litigation are thus pressured to discontinue experimentation with 
these programs289 despite the federal government’s encouragement of 
this experimentation.290 This result is particularly undesirable in the 
current educational environment where educational reform is of 
paramount importance,291 federal standards increasingly demand 
any area to members of one sex.” Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
734 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
284. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
285. See supra Subsection I.D.2. 
286. Cf. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006-08 (E.D. Mich. 
1991). 
287. See infra note 288 and accompanying text. 
288. See Rosemary Salomone, Rights and Wrongs in the Debate over Single-
Sex Schooling, 93 B.U. L. REV. 971, 983-88 (2013) (providing examples of the 
ACLU suing school districts over single-sex programs and threatening school 
districts with litigation in an effort to pressure them to drop single-sex options); Tod 
Christopher Gurney, Comment, The Aftermath of the Virginia Military Institute 
Decision: Will Single-Gender Education Survive?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1183, 
1221-22 (1998) (arguing that the Virginia Court “failed to answer important 
questions which need to be answered in order to give school officials guidance when 
implementing single-gender schools”); Robert Knight, KNIGHT: ACLU Declares 
New War on Single-Sex Education, WASH. TIMES (May 23, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/23/aclu-declares-new-war-on-
single-sex-education/?page=all (assailing the ACLU for “launch[ing] a nationwide 
jihad against single-sex education”).
289. See Salomone, supra note 288, at 983-88.
290. See supra Section I.C. 
291. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973) 
(stressing that “[t]he need is apparent for reform” and that “innovative thinking as to 
public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher 
level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity”); see also CASEY GIVEN, A
NATION STILL AT RISK: THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION AND ITS
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more of schools, and school accountability is the education mantra.292 
Therefore, because of its stringency,293 the Virginia standard of 
review hinders experimentation with single-sex schools.294 
Conversely, if a school decided to go to court in order to 
preserve its experiment, the state would be required to justify the 
constitutionality of this school under the Virginia standard of review 
by showing: (1) that it has an “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
for setting up the school, and (2) that its school meets that objective 
in basically every instance.295 In order to meet this burden, the state 
could use several arguments.296 First, the state may argue that its 
school is justified by the research showing single-sex school 
programs can benefit many students.297 The state could point to 
numerous studies that have provided an abundance of evidence 
showing the benefits of single-sex education.298 Second, the state 
may argue that its single-sex school is justified because it remedies 
the past effects of discrimination against women.299 The state could 
point to evidence that single-sex educational environments have been 
shown to be particularly beneficial to girls because girls in single-sex 
schools are more likely to prefer science, technology, and math 
courses than their counterparts in coeducational schools.300 Further, 
                                                                                                                
STATE SOLUTION (2013), http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/ 
committees/misc/ctte_h_ed_1_20130321_36_other.pdf (describing the dire need for 
education reform); Ken Robinson, Why We Need to Reform Education Now, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sir-ken-robinson/ 
reform-american-education-now_b_3203949.html (describing the need for a 
personalization of the education process).  
 292. See Rosemary Salomone, The Common School Before and After Brown: 
Democracy, Equality, and the Productivity Agenda, 120 YALE L.J. 1454, 1474-76 
(2011) (reviewing MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S 
EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK (2010)). 
 293. See Sunstein, supra note 216, at 73, 76, 78. 
 294. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 597 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The costs of litigating the constitutionality of a single-sex education 
program, and the risks of ultimately losing that litigation, are simply too high to be 
embraced by public officials.”). 
 295. See supra Section III.A. 
 296. See infra notes 297, 299, 302 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra Section I.B. 
 298. See supra Section I.B. 
 299. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 300. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 207-08; Haag, supra note 44, at 653; 
Levit, supra note 48, at 493; Mael, supra note 44, at 108-09, 111. But see Levit, 
supra note 48, at 494 (finding one study showing that single-sex education did not 
promote a preference for math among girls).  
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single-sex schooling “improves girls’ chances of landing well-paid 
careers.”301  
Similarly, the state may argue that its school is justified 
because it assists minority and disadvantaged students.302 The state 
may point to evidence that single-sex schooling has been shown to 
be particularly helpful to minority and disadvantaged students 
because the mere presence of this alternative empowers students and 
parents to choose schools that best fit their unique needs.303 While 
affluent families have always had the option to enroll their students 
in single-sex private schools, it was not until the No Child Left 
Behind Act encouraged experimentation in single-sex education in 
public schools that students from low-income, minority, and 
disadvantaged households have enjoyed that opportunity.304 Since 
then, many single-sex public schools have been established in urban 
neighborhoods, and the success stories of many of these schools are 
noteworthy.305 Providing this choice also increases competition 
among schools, which can lead to improvement in outcomes for 
schools.306 
However, by requiring an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for single-sex educational options, the Virginia 
                                                     
 301. Clark, supra note 49.  
 302. See infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 303. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 14, 28 (arguing that single-sex education 
benefits minority and disadvantaged students because it “provide[s] an avenue for 
students to make a proacademic choice, thereby affirming their intrinsic agreement 
to work in the kind of environment we identify as effective and equitable”); Brown-
Nagin, supra note 267, at 867-68; Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single-Sex 
Education, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 251-52 (1994); see also Howard Fuller, 
The Continuing Struggle for School Choice, in EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN 
AMERICA: BROWN V. BOARD AFTER HALF A CENTURY 1, 2-4 (David Salisbury & 
Casey Lartigue, Jr. eds., 2004). 
 304. See Christina Hoff Sommers, The Bizarre, Misguided Campaign to Get 
Rid of Single-Sex Classrooms, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2013/10/the-bizarre-misguided-campaign-to-get-rid-of-single-sex-
classrooms/280262/2/. 
 305. See id. One of the several examples that Sommers notes is the Irma 
Lerma Rangel Young Women’s Leadership School in Dallas, Texas, whose student 
body consists of 70% students from low-income homes and 90% minority students. 
See id. Since it opened in 2004, the school has been awarded several academic 
achievement honors and has been ranked among the top public schools in Texas by 
U.S. News & World Report. Id. 
 306. See Paul E. Peterson, The Meaning of Zelman and the Future of School 
Choice, in EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 303, at 53, 65 
(showing how areas with more parental choice leads to more competition between 
private and public schools and improved student performance). 
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standard of review only allows schools to implement single-sex 
education if they can prove that it is better than coeducation in every 
instance.307 Importantly, proving that single-sex education is better 
than coeducation on all levels, as opposed to proving that single-sex 
education provides benefits to many students, is nearly impossible.308 
First, the methodology is challenging because a randomized study 
would require the assignment of students to single-sex or coed 
schools, which is legally impossible and unethical.309 Second, 
allowing for parental involvement in such a study, a prerequisite 
because of the age of the subjects, would raise the specter of 
confounding variables such as parental education and income.310 As 
such, under the Virginia standard of review, schools wishing to 
follow research showing the benefits of single-sex education face a 
practically insurmountable burden in justifying their choice.311 
Therefore, the exacting nature312 of the Virginia standard of review 
prevents states from following research showing that single-sex 
schools benefit students.313 
Further, the rigid and conforming nature of the Virginia 
standard of review places an exceedingly high burden on schools to 
justify the implementation of single-sex education programs, even if 
the justification is remedying the effects of previous 
discrimination.314 Instead of allowing schools to fashion admission 
policies around the rule that single-sex education benefits many of 
the most disadvantaged students,315 the Virginia standard of review 
                                                     
 307. See supra Subsection I.D.2; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 308. Christine Gross-Loh, The Never-Ending Controversy over All-Girls 
Education, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2014/03/the-never-ending-controversy-over-all-girls-education/284508/. 
 309. See id.  
 310. See id. 
 311. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text. Not only is proving that 
single-sex education is better than coeducation impossible, it is also undesirable. See 
Sommers, supra note 304. Similar to the research on single-sex education, most of 
the research on the classroom effects of the length of school days, class size, and 
homework amounts is unsettled and does not all point to one direction. See id. 
Requiring the research to be unequivocal before implementing school reforms in 
these areas would lead to paralysis and hamper student achievement in education. 
See id.  
 312. See Sunstein, supra note 216, at 73, 76, 78. 
 313. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra Subsection I.D.2; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 596-97 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 315. See supra Section I.C. 
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for single-sex education is fashioned around the exception that some 
students may not share in these benefits.316 Thus, the Virginia 
standard of review prevents schools from using the unique benefits 
of single-sex education to remedy past effects of discrimination 
against women and minorities in the education field.317  
The Virginia standard of review’s detrimental effect on single-
sex education is further evidenced by the fact that federal courts 
upholding single-sex public education programs after Virginia have 
only been able to do so by skirting the application of the Virginia 
standard of review to a large extent.318 For example, the federal court 
in A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. interpreted the Virginia decision as holding 
that “barring students from educational opportunities based on their 
sex without an exceedingly persuasive justification constitutes [sex 
discrimination].”319 The court then found that because the students in 
the school at issue could choose coeducation, the students were not 
barred from educational opportunities.320 While the Virginia and 
Hogan Courts required the respective states to provide an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for the very existence of their 
single-sex admissions programs, the A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. court never 
required this.321 Therefore, although the current resurgence of single-
sex education proved Scalia’s claim of the portending extinction of 
single-sex education to be false,322 his implied claim that single-sex 
education is technically not able to survive the Virginia standard of 
review is supported by persuasive evidence.323 
                                                     
 316. See SALOMONE, supra note 26, at 220. 
 317. See Borkowski, supra note 29, at 273-75, 278 (“[A]ll-girls schools or 
all-girls classrooms are necessary as a response to gender discrimination in the 
classroom. There is widespread evidence of the prevalence of such discrimination, 
and increasingly this evidence forms the basis of arguments in favor of single-sex 
education for girls.”); see also supra notes 308-10, 316 and accompanying text. 
 318. See Cohen & Levit, supra note 9, at 358-62 (arguing the federal courts 
in A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. and Vermillion Parish misapplied the constitutional standard 
in analyzing the constitutionality of single-sex educational programs); see also supra 
Subsection I.D.4.   
 319. See A.N.A. ex rel. S.F.A. v. Breckinridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. 
Supp. 2d 673, 678 (W.D. Ky. 2011). 
 320. See id. at 678-79. 
 321. See Cohen & Levit, supra note 9, at 359. 
 322. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
 323. See generally Cohen & Levit, supra note 9, at 348-93 (arguing that 
single-sex education has no exceedingly persuasive justification and is thus 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).  
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2. The Policy Arguments Against the Constitutional Theories 
Undergirding the Virginia Standard of Review 
The main reason that the Virginia standard of review lacks 
support in policy stems from the fact that the constitutional theories 
undergirding this standard of review also lack support in policy.324 
The theory of formal equality, with its insistence on the inherent 
inequality of single-sex schools, has substantial weaknesses.325 In the 
first place, coeducation, as the alternative to single-sex schools, does 
not necessarily ensure equality of opportunity for the sexes.326 
Rather, many of the same mechanisms that promote a lack of 
opportunities for a particular sex are present in both single-sex 
education and coeducation.327 In fact, the history of coeducation 
provides many examples of sex stereotyping even in coeducational 
settings where females and males have equal access to resources and 
operate under the same curriculum.328  
Research of the historical record shows that “differences of 
form,” such as the differences between single-sex and coeducational 
school settings, are “relatively unimportant” in terms of providing 
for sexual stereotyping and discrimination.329 Thus, single-sex 
education and coeducation can be used for good or bad purposes 
with regard to students’ achievement and future opportunities.330 It is 
not the form of education, but rather the day-to-day operations and 
pedagogical attitudes and practices that make the difference in the 
risk for sexual stereotyping and discrimination in educational 
settings.331  
                                                     
 324. See infra notes 326-31, 341-44 and accompanying text. 
 325. See infra notes 326-31. 
 326. Jill E. Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full 
Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
755, 758 (2002). 
 327. See id. 
 328. See id. at 794. 
 329. See id. 
 330. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 7. An example of this fact 
can also be gleaned from a 2001 California study of single-sex public schools. See 
AMANDA DATNOW, LEE HUBBARD & ELISABETH WOODY, IS SINGLE GENDER 
SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR?: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA’S PILOT 
PROGRAM 74 (2001) (“Sex segregated education can be used for emancipation or 
oppression. As a method, it does not guarantee an outcome. The intentions, the 
understanding of people and their gender, the pedagogical attitudes and practices, 
are crucial, as in all pedagogical work.”). 
 331. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 7-8. 
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By only permitting strictly equal single-sex schools in line with 
the formal equality theory, the Court would adopt a rigid, categorical 
approach to the novel circumstances that often arise in the ever-
changing educational field.332 Additionally, requiring absolute 
equality of opportunity between single-sex educational options 
themselves, or as compared to coeducational options, is unsupported 
by the Supreme Court’s precedent.333 Lower federal courts have 
likewise held that absolute equality of opportunity for both sexes 
with regard to single-sex education is not required by the Equal 
Protection Clause.334  
The Department of Education regulations and oversight, such 
as those currently in effect, are much more effective in promoting 
equality of opportunity for both sexes in single-sex schools than the 
constitutionalization of formal equality.335 Federal law and 
regulations have been shown to be adaptable to novel circumstances 
and research findings, such as the research showing the benefits of 
single-sex education.336 Further, as a government agency, the 
Department of Education has more resources, time, and expertise to 
combat occurrences of sexual stereotyping and discrimination in 
schools than federal courts.337 This is particularly important in light 
of the fact that it is the day-to-day management and pedagogical 
attitudes and practices of schools that ultimately determine the 
pervasiveness of sexual stereotyping and discrimination in schools, 
and not the categorical form of education used.338    
The antisubordination theory, with its insistence that single-sex 
schools are only constitutional if those schools remedy the effects of 
                                                     
 332. See Jenkins, supra note 11, at 2004-05. 
 333. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring) (arguing that in order to remedy its constitutional violation, 
Virginia “does not need to create two institutions with the same number of faculty 
Ph.D.’s similar SAT scores, or comparable athletics fields”); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982) (“Mississippi maintains no other 
single-sex public university or college. Thus, we are not faced with the question of 
whether States can provide ‘separate but equal’ undergraduate institutions for males 
and females.”). 
 334. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text. 
 335. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii), (iii) (2008) (requiring single-sex 
schools to be voluntary and implemented in an “evenhanded” manner). 
 336. See supra Section I.C. 
 337. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A 
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and 
Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 421-22 (arguing that agencies 
are superior to courts in implementing statutory mandates). 
 338. Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 7. 
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historical discrimination against women,339 also suffers from various 
weaknesses.340 First, men seeking benefits given only to women have 
had most of the success in sex-discrimination cases before the 
Court.341 Second, because of its sole focus on remedying historical 
discrimination against women, this theory, at its core, advocates for 
an asymmetrical approach.342 The Court has consistently rejected 
such an approach, explicitly requiring states employing sex 
classifications not to “rely on overbroad generalizations about the 
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”343  
In the current educational environment, the anti-subordination 
approach may be especially unhelpful in promoting equal 
opportunities for students because in recent years boys have lagged 
behind girls across a spectrum of educational outcomes.344 In fact, the 
most recent research shows females outperforming males “at each 
education level since 2000.”345 Although women have historically 
been discriminated against and the United States has yet to overcome 
that history,346 it is difficult to argue that women in educational 
settings are a “discrete and insular minorit[y]” requiring heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.347 Rather, research on 
                                                     
 339. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 340. See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text. 
 341. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-94 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). 
 342. See BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 174, at 117. 
 343. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 344. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 3; SOMMERS, supra note 34, 
at 24 (contending that “it is boys, not girls, who are languishing academically”). 
 345. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2014, at 2 (2014), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/ 
2014083.pdf.  
 346. See, e.g., LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL: THE SHAMEFUL TRUTH 
ABOUT WOMEN AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 407-13 (1996) (discussing research on 
instances of sex discrimination in the criminal justice system); Eileen Patten, On 
Equal Pay Day, Key Facts About the Gender Pay Gap, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 14, 
2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/08/on-equal-pay-day-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ (finding that, based on the 
hourly wages of both full- and part-time employees in 2014, “women earn 84 
percent of what men earn”).  
 347. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The “discrete and 
insular minorit[y]” phrase was coined in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 
U.S. 144 n.4 (1938), the famous footnote four case. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) (arguing that 
footnote four is “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law”). In Carolene 
Products, Justice Stone argued that certain “discrete and insular minorities” are 
entitled to strict scrutiny because prejudice against them “may be a special 
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achievement outcomes for both girls and boys provides a more 
nuanced picture, with each sex facing different challenges in the 
educational field.348 Thus, adopting a theory that views education as a 
zero-sum game between girls and boys will not provide equal 
opportunities for all children.349 
Finally, a return to the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
standard is needed because modifying the Virginia standard of 
review by requiring the Court to take other factors into consideration 
would only serve to further confuse the already muddled case law 
surrounding single-sex education.350 Scholars have already severely 
criticized the intermediate scrutiny standard of review for allowing 
too much judicial discretion;351 providing for a sliding scale of 
intermediate scrutiny would only aggravate this fact. Further 
complicating the intermediate scrutiny standard provides no palpable 
benefits to states seeking to enact educational reforms, schools 
seeking to implement these reforms, or students seeking to benefit 
from these reforms.352  
In his Virginia concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist faulted 
VMI for not noticing the Court’s trend in single-sex education 
jurisprudence.353 He argued that while VMI was “entitled to believe 
that ‘one swallow doesn’t make a summer’ and await further 
developments” in the law,354 after the Supreme Court’s holding in 
                                                                                                                
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.   
 348. See supra Section I.A.   
 349. See ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 150 (2003) 
(“[W]hen we fail to ‘treat likes alike’—we not only limit individual liberty and 
destroy some social tradition, but we also, in effect, excommunicate: we declare 
some people to be not worthy, and thus not ‘like us’ and therefore not ‘of us.’”). 
 350. See supra Subsections I.D.1-3. 
 351. George C. Hlavac, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A 
Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1375 (1993) (“The 
intermediate-scrutiny test . . . is a much more malleable test that permits judges’ 
subjective preferences to come into play.”); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle 
Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 
325 (1998) (“[T]he Court’s use of intermediate scrutiny makes it vulnerable to 
charges of ad hoc decisionmaking.”). 
 352. Cf. supra note 351 and accompanying text. 
 353. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 561 (1996) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring); see also Mary Ann Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law 
Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1462 (2000). 
 354. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 561 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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Reed v. Reed,355 single-sex education jurisprudence developed for 
eleven years.356 Thus, VMI was “on notice . . . that [its] men-only 
admissions policy was open to serious question.”357  
Currently, more than eighteen years after the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Virginia, single-sex education jurisprudence has 
developed significantly, trending towards constitutionalizing single-
sex education programs that exhibit appropriate safeguards.358 Since 
Virginia, the federal government has encouraged experimentation 
with single-sex education programs,359 and the number of single-sex 
education programs continues to grow.360  Thus, according to Justice 
Rehnquist’s logic, the Virginia standard of review, requiring the 
strictest analysis of single-sex education programs, is open to serious 
question.361 Despite his ultimate holding, Justice Rehnquist’s 
Virginia concurrence was correct in one regard: Instead of adopting 
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” standard of review in 
analyzing single-sex education programs, the Virginia Court should 
have adhered to the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard, 
requiring that a state sex-based classification be substantially related 
to important governmental ends.362  
CONCLUSION 
Since Virginia, single-sex education has grown in popularity,363 
the federal government has decided to encourage experimentation in 
single-sex education programs,364 and lower federal courts have 
increasingly accepted state-sponsored single-sex educational 
                                                     
 355. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 356. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 561. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See supra Subsection I.D.4. Some of the safeguards that federal courts 
and federal regulations have consistently enforced are that single-sex educational 
programs and schools must be completely voluntary; that is, parents and children 
must have the choice of whether to enroll in single-sex educational classes or 
schools, and they must have a substantially equal coeducational alternative open to 
them as well. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. 
 359. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(g) 
(2006). 
 360. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.  
 361. Cf. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 561 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 362. See id. at 559 (arguing that the majority should have “adhered more 
closely . . . to [its] traditional . . . intermediate scrutiny” test). 
 363. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra Section I.C. 
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options.365 Thus, the foundation has been laid for the Supreme 
Court’s reaffirmation of the applicability of the traditional 
intermediate scrutiny standard to single-sex education.366 In order to 
reconcile the Hogan and Virginia decisions with the increasing 
acceptance of single-sex education programs in popular opinion,367 
federal law,368 and lower federal courts,369 the Supreme Court should 
reaffirm its commitment to the traditional intermediate scrutiny 
standard, thus recognizing the constitutionality of public single-sex 
education programs that meet that standard.370 
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